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Research Summary: Social status and its dynamics may
be an important predictor of which firms will engage in
large-scale bribery. Prior theory is incomplete, however,
and prior studies have lacked comprehensive and reliable
data on firm-level bribery decisions. We offer a new theo-
retical prediction and a novel data set on high-level cor-
ruption in South Korea, where the accounting records of
two presidents in the 1987–1992 era were exposed to
after-the-fact legal and public scrutiny. We find that, con-
trolling for a range of alternative explanations, the threat
of falling high status—that is, the combination of long-
standing high social status with current-period mediocre
economic performance relative to that of industry peers—
is a statistically and economically meaningful predictor of
increases in the amount of large-scale corporate bribery.
Managerial Summary: What leads companies to engage
in large-scale bribery of senior politicians? Our concept
of “threat of falling high status” refers to a circumstance
where companies that have historically enjoyed high sta-
tus through their owner families’ elite marriage networks
experience mediocre economic performance relative to
their peers. We show that this threat of falling high status
is a notable determinant of large-scale corporate bribery
of senior politicians, using court data on corporate bribery
of two South Korean presidents during 1987–1992. The
implication of our study is twofold. Companies can
strengthen internal control systems to avoid any large-
scale illegal activities at a higher level. Law enforcement
agencies can also implement targeted monitoring pro-
grams to preempt illegal activities among companies fac-
ing the threat of falling high status.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
One of the principal ways in which firms can seek competitive advantage is through nonmarket
strategy (Baron, 2013), defined as seeking to influence governmental actors to attain favorable treat-
ment and regulation. Despite the fact that much of the nonmarket strategy literature has focused on
lobbying and political contributions, and despite the magnitude of corruption in the global economy,
estimated at $1 trillion per year (Kaufmann, 2006, p. 83), few studies have examined high-level cor-
ruption where companies pay bribes to senior politicians. Pioneering work in the theory of corrup-
tion has been mostly based on political economy (Rose-Ackerman, 1975, 1978, 1999; Shleifer &
Vishny, 1993). Evidence on the firm-level determinants of bribery has largely drawn on surveys and
proxy indicators (e.g., Chavis, 2013; Clarke & Xu, 2004; Martin, Cullen, Johnson, & Parboteeah,
2007; Svensson, 2003); two notable exceptions are Jeong and Weiner (2012), using data from the
United Nations' Oil-for-Food Program (UN OFFP) made available as a result of public investigation,
and Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis (2012), utilizing media-reported data on cases of corporate bribery.
Building on this pioneering work, we study what leads firms to engage in large-scale bribery of
high-level politicians. Studying this question from a nonmarket-strategy perspective matters: high-
level politicians are known to make decisions that critically impact the competitive landscape.
Inspired by the fields of sociology, behavioral economics, and criminology, we examine the effect
of a threat of falling high status on the amount of bribes that firms paid. We term “threat of falling
high status” the concept in which a firm has longstanding high social status (defined here as being
at the center of the elite marriage network between controlling owner-families) but is threatened
with an impending fall in status due to current-period mediocre economic performance relative to
that of industry peers. We test our theoretical concept using extensive documentation of high-level
bribery in South Korea, where two former presidents, Chun Doo-Hwan (Chun) and Roh Tae-Woo
(Roh), received bribes from business groups1 during their terms of office and were subsequently
prosecuted. Their internal accounting books were unexpectedly revealed to the public in the course
of the country’s democratization.
Scholarly efforts to explain why some firms engage in large-scale bribery of high-level govern-
ment officials while others do not have run into three main challenges. First, the illegal nature of
corruption resulted in few past studies of firm-level determinants of bribery based on reliable data.
To our knowledge, prior to the current study, only the data on the UN OFFP used in Jeong and Wei-
ner (2012) specify the amounts of bribes to high-level government officials paid by individual firms,
in that case to the Iraqi government, as a result of public investigation.2
1Business groups in South Korea are also called chaebol, a family-controlled and diversified group of businesses and similar to those
business groups that exist through most of the world outside of the U.S. and the UK.
2Several other studies, though not focused on firm-level determinants, are noteworthy for utilizing unique data to measure the social-
welfare costs of bribery (e.g., Fisman & Miguel, 2007; Fisman & Wei, 2009; McMillan & Zoido, 2004; Olken & Barron, 2009;
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Second, prior studies have relied on companies’ self-reporting, which is apt to be unreliable.3
Firms may have reason to dissemble when it comes to their own illicit conduct. In contrast, the
accounting records we rely on came to light through court rulings, national legislative hearings, and
media scrutiny. South Korea’s 1996 “Trial of the Century,” which exposed the full accounting
books of Chun and Roh, resulted in criminal convictions for them and for the chairmen of several
leading business groups, including Samsung and Daewoo. These data enable us to overcome the
critical issue of data reliability and comprehensiveness in studies of corruption.
Third, while theories based on political economy have made important contributions to the
understanding of corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1999), further progress is likely to benefit from
an interdisciplinary approach drawing on sociology, behavioral economics, and criminology.
Research on firm-level determinants of bribery has focused on bargaining-power-based determinants
from economic theory (Svensson, 2003) and on companies’ financial and ownership characteristics
(Chavis, 2013; Clarke & Xu, 2004; Jeong & Weiner, 2012). This literature has not yet looked at
such other plausible determinants as social comparison effects (Ball, Eckel, Grossman, & Zame,
2001). Companies’ perceptions of how they are positioned relative to peer companies, in the market
and in society (that is, their relative status), could have a large impact on their bribery behavior.
This study aims to extend our understanding of corporate bribery via a combination of theory
development, focused on the relationship between the threat of falling high status and bribery, and
empirical analysis of a novel data set. The combination of (a) bribery data from court rulings and
investigative reports and (b) our hand-collected data on South Korean business groups’ marriage-
network standing enables us to examine whether a socioeconomic condition, threat of falling high
status, influences firms’ bribery decisions and behavior. Padgett and McLean (2006) and Ingram
and Lifschitz (2006) demonstrate that patterns of exchange relations are manifestations of social
logics, and that these social logics persist from one context to another. In emerging economies, mar-
riage networks and the dense circles of trust that they generate are typically the foundation of elite
business networks (Bunkanwanicha, Fan, & Wiwattanakantang, 2013; Kogut, 2012). Lacking well-
functioning governance institutions, most emerging economies must rely heavily on social trust to
get business done. Thus, to foreshadow our use of a modern-day example from the large emerging
economy of South Korea, historical deference in the elite marriage-matching market (whereby, like
in many countries across the globe, only certain families for decades got to marry their children into
other elite families) leads to current-period deference between family-run business groups in the eco-
nomic marketplace (Greve, Han, & Shipilov, 2016; Kang, 2002, p. 114).
Even when a family-run business group enjoys the benefits of high status—including favorable
access to resources, privileged treatment by the government, and deference from peers in terms of
market-entry decisions—those benefits can be quickly lost if the business group starts to lag behind
its peers in economic performance (Amsden, 1989, 2001; Greve et al., 2016). Status was gained
Sequeira & Djankov, 2014). For example, McMillan and Zoido (2004) analyzed the Peruvian spy chief’s payment of bribes to judges
and television broadcasters. Olken and Barron (2009) used direct observation of bribe payments via experiment to examine how
bribes are negotiated in the setting of Indonesia trucking. Sequeira and Djankov (2014) also used direct observation of bribe payments
via experiment to examine the impact of corruption on firm-level trade costs in African ports. Because our data provide comprehen-
sive coverage of high-level bribery by firms to the government, it differs from prior work focused on bribery by Montesinos in the
1990s-era Peruvian government to judges, congressman, and television station owners (McMillan & Zoido, 2004), as well as other
pioneering work by Fisman and coauthors on measuring and capturing the economic importance of corruption (e.g., Fisman, 2001;
Fisman & Miguel, 2007; Fisman & Wei, 2009).
3The focus on self-reporting led Svensson (2003: 225), in what is the pioneering empirical study of which firms engage in bribery, to
say that he could not use even his well-crafted survey questions about similar firms in the same line of business to study levels in
actual bribes made by focal companies. Jeong and Weiner (2012) also report no statistically meaningful bivariate relationship between
survey-based perceived corruption and actual corruption measured by firm-level bribery amounts to the Iraqi government during the
UN OFFP.
JEONG AND SIEGEL 1085
through historically-demonstrated superior economic performance, and status can be promptly lost
by current-period economic performance that is running behind one’s peer groups. As we know
from the prior literature on the economic development of South Korea (Amsden, 1989, 2001), busi-
ness groups originally achieved high status by means of historically superior economic performance,
a phenomenon similar to the concept of historically-determined status legacy (Malter, 2014;
Washington & Zajac, 2005). A number of business groups that enjoyed high status in the 1960s sub-
sequently failed to deliver superior economic performance and dropped out of the high-status elite
(Amsden, 1989). A key mechanism was that mediocre performance rapidly led the next generation
of their families to no longer be attractive partners in the elite marriage market, which then made
their business groups receive less deference and fewer resources in the economic marketplace, which
in turn led to further rapid erosion of their economic position. In South Korea, which is a dynami-
cally competitive economy, this process in fact occurred promptly for some business groups that
were in the social elite in the 1960s.
As a result, those under threat of falling high status—that is, those historically endowed with
high status in the marriage market but facing current-time mediocre performance relative to peers—
may engage more in illicit bribery designed to raise their performance in the economic market. Busi-
ness groups under threat of falling high status will be motivated, as seen in Askin and Bothner
(2016), to attempt a radical change in their actions. For reasons of motivation, resource availability,
and inability to compete through other market means, we predict that firms under threat of falling
high status will pay larger bribes to high-level government officials than all other firms, all else
equal.
In the next section, we develop the theoretical concept of the threat of falling high status and
how it relates to corporate bribery. Next, we discuss our empirical context and strategy. We then
present results and conclude by discussing the implications of our findings.
2 | THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
2.1 | Status and bribery
Status, as succinctly defined by Ball et al. (2001, p. 161), is “a ranking in a hierarchy that is socially
recognized and typically carries with it the expectation of entitlement to certain resources.” High sta-
tus is thus a high position in a ranked pecking order of individuals or firms; it is often of first-order
importance as an individual- or firm-level objective. For firms, status is not purely financial but also
socially embedded and historically persistent. Adam Smith, the father of neoclassical economics,
was a pioneering theorist on the role of social status (which he called “place”) in economic
decision-making. An oft-forgotten insight of Adam Smith’s is that status is a direct source of utility
and provides important benefits of deference from others (1759/1976, p. 52). Status has in fact been
shown in numerous experimental and empirical studies to have key market benefits. As shown in a
laboratory experimental market by Ball et al. (2001), those with higher status (even when that status
is randomly assigned) are able to sell a generic good at higher prices and thus to capture a greater
share of a surplus than their lower-status counterparts. Not only are lower-status actors willing to
pay more to purchase goods from higher-status actors; higher status actors are also able to secure
more favorable outcomes in the marriage matching market that codifies high status (even controlling
for their wealth) (Almenberg & Dreber, 2009).
One universal phenomenon of achieving and cementing social status is through marriage. Mar-
riage of children between business families has long been seen in the field of business history as a
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key form of cementing status of the owner-managers of those businesses (Barker, 2017; Grassby,
2001; Padgett & Ansell, 1993). We know not just from the historical work of Padgett and Ansell
(1993), but also of more recent work in emerging economies (as but one example, see Bunkanwani-
cha et al., 2013) that one of the key objectives for elite business families is to secure high social sta-
tus through marriage of their children to other elite business families. While the U.S. and the UK
are today outliers relative to the rest of the world for their relatively dispersed corporate ownership,
even the business history of the U.S. reflects the historic role of marriage between the families con-
trolling business groups to cement social status (such as the marriage union between Andrew Carne-
gie’s family based in steel with other elite industrial families of its time).
The importance of looking at the interaction between social ties, including elite marriage ties,
and their influence on corporate strategic behavior is well pointed out by the message from Kogut
(2012, p. 49) that if we are interested in the linkage between institutions and strategy, we should
closely examine the fact that “institutions are rooted in norms and social rules.” As Kogut also
points out in the same piece, the study of marriage and related networks has gone from being a “sta-
ple industry of sociology to a subject of interest in computer science, applied physics, economics,
and other natural and social sciences” (Kogut, 2012, p. 3). As Kogut goes on to explicate, “Part of
this interest reflects the interest in understanding how micro-behaviors (e.g., social rules of who
marries whom, who buys what, etc.) govern the topology of the network” (2012, p. 3). We take this
fundamental insight one step further by looking at the effect of the threat of falling high status in the
elite marriage network on actual corporate nonmarket behavior (in this case, corporate bribery of
senior government officials).
We will discuss below how three distinct literatures, in behavioral economics, criminology, and
sociology, provide theory and/or empirical findings that help make sense of the radical actions that
firms will take when faced with the threat of the loss of high status. Foundational support from these
three fields will help build our concept of the threat of falling high status and explicate its effect on
motivating certain firms to pay large-scale bribes to high-level government officials.
2.1.1 | Behavioral economics
The literature of behavioral economics shows that it is maximally painful to fall from an initial posi-
tion of high status. Kahneman and Tversky’s seminal work (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) shows
that perceived pain from pending losses is most severe when starting at an initial high point
(e.g., see the examples in Kahneman, 2013. pp. 275–277, 302–304). Building on Kahneman and
Tversky’s work, Kern and Chugh (2009) show in a series of lab experiments that people are more
likely to engage in unethical behavior when operating in a loss-frame context (in which an unethical
choice increases the probability of avoiding a potential loss) than in a gain-frame context (in which
an unethical choice increases the probability of potential gain). Participants in their study were more
likely to choose unethical behavior to avoid a 75% probability of losing a business sale than to
secure a 25% probability of gaining a potential sale. Grolleau, Kocher, and Sutan (2016) similarly
show that people are so threatened by a potential loss of income that their level of cheating at a sim-
ple task shoots upward when they are suddenly faced with an immediate threat of income loss.
Balasubramanian, Bennett, and Pierce (2017) also provide survey- and simulation-based evidence
that the internal costs of dishonesty are convex: that is, dishonesty increases as rewards increase, but
decreases at the highest reward levels. In our theoretical context, this pattern predicts smaller gains
from bribery for those whose high status is most secure. In other words, those with very secure high
status may experience higher internal costs of dishonesty (e.g., greater loss in reputation and brand
from being revealed as dishonest) and have little further to gain from bribery since their (industry-
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adjusted) performance is already far better than peers’. By contrast, those temporarily insecure about
their high status tend to perceive high short-term rewards from resorting to bribery as a pathway back
to high-ranking performance and secure high status. They also tend to view bribery as temporary and
transient, which may well lower the internal costs of dishonesty (Balasubramanian et al., 2017).
2.1.2 | Criminology
The criminology literature also offers foundational support for the threat of falling high status and cor-
porate bribery. Applying the logic of Kahneman and Tversky in his field study of white-collar crimi-
nals, Wheeler speculates (Wheeler, 1992, p. 114) that “fear of falling” is a leading cause of white-
collar crime. Similarly, Weisburd, Wheeler, Waring, and Bode (1991) portray an individual who, hav-
ing attained wealth and status through honest hard work, faces an impending drop in income and jus-
tifies short-term crime as a temporary means of recapturing the original position (Weisburd et al.,
1991, p. 189). Wheeler (1992, p. 119) described his portrayal of the typical white-collar criminal as
speculative, but also contemplated whether a similar logic would apply to firms and their leadership
groups. Another important insight from the criminology literature is that fear of status loss is about
those with high status who are experiencing a short-term financial setback. It is noteworthy that the
sudden adversity that the focal individuals or firms face (in terms of mediocre financial performance)
and that can lead to status loss is on a different dimension (financial performance) from the dimension
(elite marriage ties) in which their status was originally formed. Also, the choice to engage in short-
term criminality is based on a belief in the possibility of a realistic recovery and consolidation of high
status. This implies, in our research context, that it is not those high-status firms with the most severe
financial problems that can lead to bankruptcy or failure that will engage in large-scale bribery or
other similarly significant misconduct (Weisburd et al., 1991; Wheeler, 1992).
2.1.3 | Sociology and related organizational theory
Early empirical research in sociology was inconclusive about the impact of status on unethical
behavior, perhaps because it focused solely on high status and not on the threat of losing high status.
Those prior studies offered opposing arguments (which tend to cancel each other out) on whether
high status might lead directly to nonconformity with social norms (e.g., Dittes & Kelley, 1956). On
the one hand, high-status firms may be more likely to engage in large-scale bribery because they are
confident that their high status affords them license to engage in deviant behavior (Becker, 1963;
Dittes & Kelley, 1956), because they have more resources to spend on bribery, or because they
think they can more easily hide their bribery behavior (through slick relationship management or
sneakier accounting). On the other hand, such firms might reject bribery because they can generate
higher returns by investing in R&D and marketing; or because they have attained such dominant
market power that they will not incrementally gain from bribery; or because detection would endan-
ger their brands at higher cost and imperil their ultimate profitability; or because public expectations
of exemplary conduct on their part would result in unusually harsh punishment if misconduct were
discovered (Giordano, 1983). Given the opposing mechanisms described here, it is not surprising
that the literature produced muddled and contradictory results. This suggests the need for the more
fully specified logic that better explains who engages in large-scale corporate bribery.
In support of our thesis that the threat posed by a mismatch between firms’ high status and
current-period financial underperformance leads firms to engage in large-scale bribery, consider
Rider and Tan’s (2015) recent demonstration of what happens when high-status U.S. law firms lose
employees to lower-status competitors. Those competitors are typically more profitable; thus, high-
status firms begin to lose the benefits of their status, including attracting and retaining talent in the
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labor market, if they suddenly become less profitable than lower-status firms. Given that such firms
lack the market means to compete in terms of current-period profitability, one can conjecture that
radical action, such as bribery, is among their few remaining options for securing needed resources
to boost profitability and re-secure their high status.
Further inspiration for our focus on the mismatch between firms’ high status and current-period
mediocre economic performance can also be found in strain theory in sociology (Merton, 1968).
Inspired in part by the work of Cyert and March (1963), Greve (2003) showed that companies are
more likely to engage in misconduct if they are underperforming peers or underperforming relative
to their own past success. Strain theory thus suggests that organizations experiencing threats to their
competitive position (Vaughan, 1999) may be more likely to engage in misconduct.4
We will eventually differ, however, from some latter-day strain theorists, including Mishina,
Dykes, Block, and Pollock (2010), who found that firms performing well above their peers ulti-
mately engaged in misconduct because of a combination of hubris and outsized performance expec-
tations. Also, what Greve calls “aspiration levels” (2003, p. 3) are only one piece of the theoretical
picture we aim to present. Firms aspire to membership in the high-status group, and anything that
potentially mires them in limbo about their ongoing membership in the high-status group (and thus
a fall into the next territory of middle status) will motivate them to consider whether short-term ille-
gal conduct can offer a quick boost back into secure high-status territory. Our theory thus differs
from that of Mishina et al. (2010)—which evokes the lyrics of “High Flying, Adored” from the
musical Evita—that outsized expectations and hubris promote fraudulent conduct. Though we agree
that firms constantly compare themselves to peers (Greve, 2003), we think that the more fully speci-
fied logic presented here explains more of the observed variation in corporate bribery.
2.2 | The concept of the threat of falling high status
Jointly, the literatures of behavioral economics, criminology, and sociology provide foundational
insights for our concept of the threat of falling high status. The concept describes high status firms’
fear of falling over into the next territory (hypothetically, middle status where the members of that
group can enjoy only some of the benefits that high status group can fully enjoy) in the wake of the
threat arising from a mismatch between high status and current-time mediocre economic perfor-
mance relative to peers. This concept also suggests that it is not the direct effect of high status or of
temporary financial underperformance, but the interaction effect of the two, that leads firms threat-
ened by a fall in high status to pay larger bribes than all other firms, ceteris paribus. The interaction
between the two also suggests that the dimension on which status was originally gained need not be
the one on which its loss is threatened. In our research context, strong financial performance histori-
cally led to high status cemented via elite marriage, and then it is poor financial underperformance
that starts to threaten high status. Past studies also indicate that fear of status loss leads to concrete
expenditure on unethical action (Weisburd et al., 1991; Wheeler, 1992) only in the presence of a
combination of available/liquid resources, talent/capabilities, and realistic prospects of securing a
positive, long-term return to high status by engaging in unethical actions. In other words, those
experiencing the most severe financial problems, and thus lagging far behind their peers, will typi-
cally lack the resources necessary to bribe on a large scale.
4Martin et al. (2007) show, for example, through firms’ self-reporting in World Bank surveys that if they perceive a greater number
of competitors that are viable threats to their competitive advantage, then they are more likely to report that firms in their country
environment often engage in bribery.
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From the fields of strategy and organizational theory, there are three logical responses to the
threat of falling high status. Firms can invest more in market-oriented capabilities, which we seek to
control for, particularly R&D, exporting, advertising, and training of employees. Their current-time
mediocre performance, however, can prevent them from using legitimate economic means to pro-
duce the ongoing profit flows necessary to maintain and support their high status in a timely man-
ner. As a result, they may look to bribery as a quick boost to secure the government-provided
resources and treatment that can enable them to compete on market means over the longer term.
Firms can also invest in relational ties, which we also seek to control for, such as personal ties to
government actors. The last strategic option for firms is to choose direct bribes to politicians. It is
worth noting that the U.S. is a unique country case in that it offers the legalized option of lobbying
and of post–Citizens United direct corporate engagement in political campaigns; this formalized and
legalized option is rare elsewhere. In many other countries, a direct bribe payment to politicians is
among their few remaining options for a quick boost back into secure high-status territory.
While controlling for alternative choices and explanations, our focus here is primarily on the
threat of falling high status as a determinant of large-scale corporate bribery, and on whether this
unexplored socio-economic predictor can explain variability in large-scale bribery of high-level gov-
ernment officials. In summary, based on the combination of threat, resource availability to pay
large-scale bribes, but inability to compete in the short run via market means, and belief that short-
term payment of large-scale bribes will deliver the politically-determined resources that will help
them reclaim secure high-status standing, firms under threat of falling high status will engage in
large-scale bribery of high-level government officials as a tool to address such a threat, ceteris pari-
bus. This leads us to state the following central hypothesis of this study:
Hypothesis The higher the socially endowed status that a business entity initially
enjoys, the higher the amount of bribes it pays to government officials, following a
threat of falling high status (socially-endowed high status interacted with mediocre
economic performance relative to its peers).
3 | THE EMPIRICAL CONTEXT: SOUTH KOREA
We next turn to the empirical context in which we test our hypothesis. South Korea is an economi-
cally important test case. It is currently the world’s 11th largest economy, with gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) of $1.38 trillion according to the most recently available year 2015 data from the Work
Bank’s World Development Indicators. Even as early as the 1990 midpoint of our sample time
period, South Korea was among the world’s 15 largest economies (World Bank, 2017). South Korea
is also representative of emerging economies: it is among the 65 countries that experienced the third
wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991; Møller & Skaaning, 2013, p. 99). Its level of corruption
is comparable to many other countries’ (e.g., it ranked 27th out of the 41 countries that Transpar-
ency International surveyed for its first Corruption Perception Index in 1995 and 43rd out of
85 countries surveyed in 1998)5; and its corporate governance institutions rank similarly to those of
numerous peer countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997, 2000, 2002).
5As illustrated here, South Korea is one of a large number of countries where bribery is perceived to be moderate to severe, but also
representative of a large number of countries where large-scale corporate bribery is condemned by the broader public. In Appendix
S1, we provide our summary discussion on a series of South Korean public surveys on corporate bribery.
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Chun and Roh, both former army generals, led South Korea from 1980 to early 1993. Chun
(1980–1988) seized power in a coup d’état following the death of the prior military dictator; Roh
(1988–1993), Chun’s chosen successor, was elected in 1987 when the two non-military leaders of
the democracy movement could not unite behind one candidate and split the vote (e.g., see Seo,
2007). It has been widely documented, beginning as early as 1988, that during the Chun and Roh
administrations some business groups influenced politicians and government bureaucrats with large-
scale bribes, and that these business groups received favored treatment in return for the bribes
(e.g., see Kang, 2002; Kim, 1997; Park, 1988; Yoo, 1988). In the mid-1990s, during the country’s
democratic transition, Chun and Roh were prosecuted for corruption; their internal accounting books
were unexpectedly opened up to the world by public investigation in 1995. Chun was ordered by
the Seoul High Court to repay 220.5 billion won ($256 million in 1996) received in bribes from
business groups; Roh was ordered to repay 262.8 billion won ($305 million) received as bribes from
business groups. Several prominent business group heads (including Samsung’s Lee Kun-Hee and
Daewoo’s Kim Woo-Choong) were also found guilty of bribery (Suh, 1996).
The ramifications of paying bribes to Chun and Roh are apparent in several well-known cases.
One conduit through which Chun collected bribes was the Ilhae Foundation, a quasi-research foun-
dation that he established while in office. At a time when comparable business groups
(e.g., Daewoo, Hyundai, Lotte, and Samsung) each contributed 3–4.5 billion won to Ilhae (Yoo,
1988, p. 389), Kukje Group, then the nation’s seventh-largest business group, almost totally rejected
the choice of paying bribes,6 contributing only 0.5 billion won to Ilhae, upon request. In 1985 the
Chun administration announced Kukje’s bankruptcy and dismembered the group.7 Numerous Kukje
affiliates were then taken over by Hanil Synthetic Fiber (Hanil), Kukdong Construction, and Dong-
kuk Steel, all of which were much smaller than Kukje but had paid much larger bribes (e.g., see
Kim, 1997; Yoo, 1988). Specifically, Hanil increased its 1986 contribution by 53% over the preced-
ing year; the same year, it acquired several Kukje affiliates. Its total 1983–1987 contributions ranked
second among the top 30 business groups.
The final year of Chun’s presidency (1987) saw more such activity—payment of more bribes
than expected for purported benefits. Hanil’s contributions reached nearly 7.3 billion won
(an increase of 56%) in 1987; that year Hanil acquired Jinhae Chemical, the largest producer of
compound fertilizer. The contribution of Korean Air Line (KAL) grew suddenly by 66% (to about
5.1 billion won) in 1987 vis-à-vis the year before. KAL subsequently acquired Korean Shipping
Line, a company whose CEO testified at the 1989 national hearing that he had declined Chun’s
request for political funds. Most notably, Kumho Group, which operated express bus services,
increased its contribution by more than 900% from 0.3 billion won in 1986 to nearly 2.8 billion won
in 1987; Kumho’s application to own and operate South Korea’s second-largest private airline was
accepted 1 day before Chun left office in 1988 (Yoo, 1988, p. 389).
Under the Roh administration, Samsung—facing a threat of falling high status—paid larger
bribes than peers and received licenses and permits in industries like aerospace, automobiles, large-
scale construction, and in petrochemicals.8 Another example that supports our thesis is Doosan: dur-
ing the Roh administration, when the company enjoyed fairly high social status and very high per-
formance relative to peers, it paid few bribes. Interestingly, our court and financial data also show
that Lotte, a group with high social status in the same time period, paid bribes whose amounts fluc-
tuated a great deal: its payments were twice as high when its performance relative to peers was low,
6See Kim (1997, pp. 200–203), Kang (2002, pp. 102–104) and Rhee (2002, pp. 215–217).
7In 1993, the Constitutional Court of Korea ruled the government’s dismembering Kukje Group as unconstitutional.
8Various media sources including Seoul Broadcasting News (12/11/2016).
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and typically low when its performance relative to peers was relatively high. We also see that Han-
jin, whose social status was high under the Roh administration, paid a higher bribe when it faced
the threat of falling high status, but not otherwise. Lastly, Hyundai paid high bribes for multiple
years when it was facing the threat of falling high status and then stopped paying bribes when its
performance relative to peers was markedly better at the end of the Roh administration.
4 | EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
4.1 | Data
Our bribery data come from two main sources: South Korea’s court verdicts (The Seoul District
Court, 1996; The Seoul High Court, 1996; The Supreme Court of Korea, 1997; hereafter the court
data) and the special investigative report by The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea
(1990, pp. 149–151, 264–284) produced as a result of the national hearings (1988) on high-level
corruption scandals during the Chun administration. The Seoul District Court verdict (1996) indi-
cates that companies paid a total bribe of 220.5 billion won ($256 million) to Chun and 283.9 bil-
lion won ($330 million) to Roh during their respective presidencies. The data show that, of the
business entities large enough to be required to disclose audited financial statements in at least
2 years during the 1987–1992 time period, 40 business groups paid a bribe in at least 1 year during
that sample time period.9 These 40 business groups constitute our sample, which provides us
237 group-year observations for our panel analysis (one of the 40 business groups has only 3 years
of audited financial data; the other 39 groups have data for all 6 years of our sample time period).
Note that each of these 40 business groups had multiple affiliates, but was controlled by a single
owner-shareholder family; bribes were paid not at the affiliate level but at the business-group level,
through the group chairman’s office, which is the dominion of the controlling owner-shareholder.
As seen in the court records, these bribes were viewed and categorized as coming from the business
group as a common entity controlled by the controlling owner-shareholder. Because each business
group is controlled by a single person, who is head of an elite family, it also makes sense that the
person would be focused in no small part on their individual and family aspirations, and that these
individual and family aspirations would then get channeled into decision-making and behavior for
the business group they control. This provides us a natural and logical connection from individual
constructs of social status via elite marriage ties to firm decisions.
For our empirical analysis, we highlight two things. First, our sample of 40 business groups
from the court data have towered over South Korea’s economy during and after our sample time
period. These 40 large business groups represent hundreds of large firms that collectively in turn
represent a very high percentage of the total value-added in South Korea. This can be seen in terms
of the 30 largest business groups’ share of their total sales in South Korea’s gross national product,
which was 70.1% in 1988 (Cho, 1997, p. 81). It is also important to note that it is not the case that
we are only including groups that gave bribes. The trial record showed that Chun and Roh focused
on this specific set of 40 large business groups plus one other without sufficient accounting data and
required solely that all such large business groups give at least a modest nominal bribe amount at
9We note that there were 13 other business entities that were originally reported in the court data to have paid at least modest-sized
bribes to Chun and Roh, but 10 entities did not have affiliates meeting the minimal regulatory size standard for them to have to report
publicly audited financial data during our sample time period. One business group (Kukje) was dismembered by Chun by the start of
our sample time period, another business group (Hangyang) did not pay bribes in the 4 years during our sample time period in which
it had publicly available financial data, and another (Asia Cement) did not meet the minimal regulatory size standard to have to report
2 or more years of publicly audited financial data during our sample time period. This leaves us with a sample of 40 business groups.
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least once. Kukje Group that refused to give anything was the outlier that was subsequently dismem-
bered by Chun, as discussed earlier.
Second, our analysis focuses on the 1987–1992 time period because those are the years when
fully audited firm-level financial data became publicly available in South Korea and because one of
the main independent variables of interest is a firm-level predictor that relies on company financials.
Although 1987, the last full year of the Chun administration, is the only year during the Chun
administration for which we had full firm-level financial data, our sample time period 1987–1992 is
representative of the overall era of Chun and Roh’s presidencies given that Chun and Roh were
political allies whose administrations are perceived as a single period of time.10
Also note that the Seoul High Court on an appeal let Chun relieve himself of legal penalty on
a small subset of bribes involving five business groups in our sample. We choose deliberately not
to drop those data because it is clear, according to numerous Korean sources that those bribes were
in fact collected in the name of Chun by his closest aides and were used for political funds
designed to benefit Chun. The only reason why Chun was able to relieve himself of legal penalty
on those few observations is because the prosecutors could not prove that Chun himself had con-
tacted the firms or received the funds in person.11 That said, Chun himself admitted in sworn testi-
mony that he called for the collection of funds that were then collected by his closest aides and
then deposited into a political fund designed to aid Chun’s political group. Because some of the
foundations that received funds were managed by Chun’s spouse, we do not think it matters for
this context whether Chun himself called up these firms or received the money in person. What
matters is that the clique at the very top of the government received the payment and used it for
the benefit of that clique.
We augment our bribery data from the Seoul District Court verdict by adding quasi-
contributions made by the 40 business groups to key quasi-foundations that Chun and his spouse
established during Chun’s presidency. They include, in addition to the Ilhae Foundation discussed
earlier, the New Generation Heart Foundation and the New Generation Education Foundation
established by Chun’s spouse. These quasi-contribution data come from the special investigative
report by The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea (1990). We cross-checked our bribery
data with numerous media sources in South Korea. They include South Korea’s major political
periodicals, daily newspapers, books that analyzed the political era of Chun and Roh, and tran-
scripts from South Korea’s major news broadcasters (see Appendix S3 for specific sources we
consulted).
Next, we match the bribe data with audited statutory financial statements from the National
Information and Credit Evaluation (NICE) agency. NICE is the leading credit-rating agency in
South Korea and is the major source of reliable financial statements of South Korean firms. To be
included in the analysis, the statutory companies should meet our criteria of both being part of one
of the 40 business groups and having financial data that are audited during this 1987–1992 time
period. They include privately held affiliates that met the relatively modest asset requirements which
made them subject to mandatory disclosure of financial statements.
Lastly, we construct our key covariate, “Threat of Falling High Status” (discussed below) using
our hand-collected relational database. It shows the detailed marriage network among the controlling
owners’ families of South Korean business groups over time. This comprehensive marriage tie
10Appendix S2 provides photographic evidence that shows Chun and Roh when they were the military cadets of the 11th class (1951)
of the Korean Military Academy and when they were later prosecuted and holding hands in their first public trial in 1996.
11We confirm this from the interview with Rhee Jong-Chan (the then chief of the central investigation department of the Supreme
Prosecutor’s Office of South Korea) conducted for this study in South Korea in 2015.
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database was constructed and checked over time based on a number of different South Korea’s
online and offline sources for personal profiles.12 Figure 1 depicts those South Korean business
groups with marriage ties to other South Korean business groups at the beginning and at the end of
our 1987–1992 sample time period. A line between two business groups represents a direct marriage
tie between them. Other business groups not in the figure are isolates without any marriage ties to
any other South Korean business groups.
For our panel analysis below, we utilize 237 group-year observations because one of the 40 busi-
ness groups in our sample has only 3 years of audited financial data whereas the other 39 groups
have data for all 6 years of our sample time period.
4.2 | Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is “Yearly Bribe Paid by Business Group,” which is the annual bribe
amount (KRW billion) paid by each of the 40 business groups. As shown in Table 1, the annual
group bribery amount ranges from zero to 14 billion won with an average of 1.45 billion won.
During the sample time period (1987–1992), our exploratory data analysis also reveals that each
business group paid 8.57 billion won on average over the 6 years ranging from 0.2 billion won to
35 billion won in total. Figure 2 describes each business group’s total amount of bribes during the
sample time period. Figure 3 depicts each business group’s individual bribe amount by year. Each
marker in Figure 3 is frequency weighted, thus the bigger the marker, the more the number of the
same bribe amount by different business groups at each bribe level in that particular year.
FIGURE 1 The marriage network among South Korean business groups at the beginning (1987) and the end (1992) of the
sample time period
12This database was constructed with the help of a team of research assistants in South Korea. Data on family structure and individual
family members’ resumes were collected and cross-checked with over 25 respected Korean data sources, including two personal pro-
file databases (Donga and Joong-Ang) that collect life-long resumes on over 200,000 Korean citizens. While these two sources were
highly impressive in their coverage, there were some missing data points. To maximize the comprehensive nature of the data set, we
collected further data and cross-checked all observations mostly using the Korean Integrated News Database System (KINDS), the
Korean version of Lexis-Nexis.
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4.3 | Independent variables
4.3.1 | Threat of falling high status
Our hypothesis suggests that those business groups with high status but current-period economic
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FIGURE 3 Each business group’s individual bribe amount by year
Note. Each marker in this scatter plot is frequency weighted, thus counts the number of duplicate bribe amount by different
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FIGURE 2 Each business group’s total amount of bribes
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motivation to engage in illicit bribery will also depend on the strength of their socially endowed sta-
tus. It is important to note in the South Korean context that membership in the high-status category
as of 1980 went to business groups that were typically started around 1940 and attained country-
leading productivity and profitability by the 1960s and 1970s. Given that they were by far the most
productive business groups in South Korea by the early 1980s (Amsden, 1989), their main concern
was never with failing economically or even falling to the bottom quartile but with simply falling
anywhere into the large middle-status category in which they would not enjoy anywhere near the
prior level of access to outside resources.
To test our hypothesis, we construct two measures of “Threat of Falling High Status (Threat of
FHS) Definitions 1 and 2” which are the interaction terms between “Bonacich Measures of Status”
and “Mediocre ROA Performance.” We first measure business groups’ social endowment of high
status in a given year by their owner-manager family being central in the intergroup marriage net-
work using Bonacich’s (1987) centrality score. Bonacich’s (1987) c(α, β) measure is a commonly
used measure for relational data on status (Podolny, 2005).13 As summarized in Sauder, Lynn, and
Podolny (2012, pp. 274–275), Bonacich’s (1987) centrality score considers both the amount of def-
erence received and the extent to which deference is directed. This measure, according to Sauder
et al. (2012, p. 274), “is clearly consistent with the view that an actor’s status is inherently tied to
the status of her associates” and emphasizes “how status leaks or diffuses through relations.” We
calculate this marriage network-based Bonacich measure of status using the software program UCI-
NET (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002), where the standard setting for the Beta term in calculat-
ing the Bonacich measure is 0.995/maxeigen.14
Next, we measure “Mediocre ROA Performance” using a dummy that takes the value of one if
the business group’s ROA performance is between the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile of
industry-adjusted and industry-weighted ROA performance relative to peers. Note that we define
“Mediocre ROA Performance” in keeping with the local contextual relevance and consistent with
prior sociological theory. Local contextual relevance comes from the fact that South Korea since
1964 has focused on the evolving membership of the top 10 list of most successful business groups
at both the elite and broader societal levels. From the 1960s until today, government comparisons of
these business groups include a focus on who are in the top 10. Also, going back to the 1980s, in
South Korea’s antitrust law, there is a particular focus on who is in the top 10. The top 10 is 25% of
the 40 business groups that were expected to give at least a one-time minimal bribe to Chun and
Roh. Prior sociological theory also states that elite membership is scarce and tends to fall smaller
than middle status membership. Putting these facts together, it is logical that business groups wanted
to remain in the top 25% of performance relative to peers.
Next, consistent with prior sociological theory as well as based on what is readily apparent in
the data, the range for mediocre performance is by far the largest, with low performance by those in
the bottom 25th quartile, who are so far behind everyone else that they would likely be lacking in





where α is a scaling factor, β is a weighting factor, R is a relational matrix, which is 0 along the main diagonal and in which cell rij
summarizes the relative superiority (or inferiority) of group i with respect to group j, and 1 is a column vector of ones. For detailed
explanations on this measure, see Podolny (2005, pp. 57–58).
14During our sample time period, divorce within the elite marriage network was essentially absent. More than a decade after our sam-
ple time period, there was a notable divorce involving Samsung. It would be interesting to analyze how divorce impacts social status
of elite families, but we are not in a position to analyze the impact of divorce on social status or bribery behavior in this study.
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the resources to even pay a bribe if they wanted to do so. We therefore define “Mediocre ROA Per-
formance” as existing between the 25th and the 75th percentiles of industry-adjusted and industry-
weighted ROA performance relative to peers. A number of robustness checks show that our results
do not change.15
Given our status and performance measures, “Threat of FHS Definition 1” is the interaction term
between “Bonacich Measure of Status in 1987” (high status measured by the Bonacich centrality in
year 1987 marriage network among Korean business groups) and “Middling ROA Performance.”
“Threat of FHS Definition 2” replaces the term “Bonacich Measure of Status in 1987” in Definition
1 with “Bonacich Measure of Status by Year” (high status measured by the Bonacich centrality in
this year’s marriage network among Korean business groups). The two measures of “Threat of FHS
Definitions 1 and 2” are positively correlated with “Yearly Bribe Paid by Business Group” (0.31
and 0.32, respectively, both with p = 0.000) at the bivariate levels.
4.3.2 | Relational ties
We construct a set of other social network-based indicators to control for their possible influences
on the business groups’ bribery decisions and amounts. Specifically, we aim to control for the possi-
bility that the formation of close personal ties to politicians either leads business groups to dramati-
cally increase—or reduce—their bribery payments. It is interesting to note that close personal ties
could dramatically increase bribery payments if the ties come with an expectation for frequent
resource sharing with the politician. Alternatively, close personal ties could decrease bribery pay-
ments if the politician is willing to do a favor at a cheaper price for a close personal tie. We thus
include a time-varying indicator of whether the business group had at least one marriage tie to a
senior government official or politician in a given year (“Marriage Tie to a Senior Gov’t Official or
Politician by Year”). Also, note that the basis of social networks in South Korea is regional,16 with
strong ties that develop as a result of attending the same elite regional high school (Siegel, 2007,
p. 631). To adjust for these social network-based influences on the business groups’ bribery deci-
sions, we include a time-varying indicator of whether owner-manager’s family of the business group
has a school or marriage tie to Chun or Roh (“Group Has School or Marriage Tie to Chun or Roh
by Year”). Table 1 reveals that 57% of the 40 business groups have at least one immediate political
marriage tie and 16% of those business groups have a school or marriage tie to Chun or Roh during
the sample time period.
15Our results are robust (a) to further controlling for the top quartile of performance and the interaction of high status and top quartile
performance; (b) to having the “Threat of FHS Definition 2” variable temporarily include the mere four group-year observations out
of 237 of a firm with status in the top quartile and relative performance below the 25th percentile, (c) to having the “Threat of FHS
Definition 2” variable temporarily include the one single group-year observation with status >5, which is an alternative cutoff for yet
higher status and performance in the bottom quartile, (d) to controlling for each quartile of performance and status interacted with
each quartile of performance (where the bottom quartile is the omitted category to be the reference set), (e) to temporarily expanding
the “Mediocre ROA Performance” by an observation at both the bottom and upper ends, (f ) and (g) temporarily substituting the
“Threat of FHS Definition 2” variable and using alternatively a continuous interaction term of status and relative performance and
limiting the sample to the just over 175 observations with values of the interaction term between −0.5 and 0.5, and with the somewhat
smaller number of observations with values of the interaction term between −0.1 and 0.1, and (h) to using that same continuous inter-
action term for status × relative performance, including the full sample, and partialing out the effect of dummy variables for (status ×
relative performance) being less than −0.5 and larger than 0.5.
16Regional origin is a time-invariant group characteristic and therefore gets absorbed as part of the group fixed effects. Regional
enmity stemming from political rivalry and oppression long existed between Koreans from the Jeolla (southwest, the oppressed) and
the Gyeongsang (southeast, the oppressing) regions. For a description of South Korean political networks, see Siegel (2007, pp.
631–634).
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4.3.3 | Financial and industry characteristics
We also control for a number of financial and industry characteristics of the business groups as such
characteristics could have the potential to be alternatively driving the group-level motivation,
resource availability, and incentive to engage in corporate bribery. Prior studies of corruption
(e.g., Chavis, 2013; Martin et al., 2007; Svensson, 2003; Van Vu, Tran, Van Nguyen, & Lim, 2016)
suggest that one’s cash flow profitability (ROA), firm size, leverage, financial constraint, and finan-
cial standing relative to peers could have independent effects on the bribery decision. We thus con-
struct and fully control for “Group ROA by Year” (total group operating profit/total group assets),
“Log of Group Assets by Year,” “Group Leverage by Year,” and “Industry-adjusted and -weighted
Group Portfolio ROA by Year” (each business group’s average industry-adjusted and -weighted
ROA calculated by first taking each affiliate’s ROA relative to its four-digit industry ROA perfor-
mance, and then weighting by the relative assets by industry of the business group’s affiliates, so
that anything below zero means that the group is behind its industry peers). The last control variable
is centered at its own sample mean so that we could do a robustness check in which we examine its
squared term and remove any possible collinearity concern between those two control variables and
the set of other control variables listed in the next paragraph. (The results are the same with and
without the centering of this control variable.)
As discussed earlier, we also control for “Export Intensity,” “Advertising Intensity,” “R&D
Intensity,” and “Training Expenditure Intensity.” They are mean-centered variables which are con-
structed as a percentage of total sales in that particular year and then centered at their own sample
means.17 Because the typical expenditure on training is very small, “Training Expenditure Intensity”
is scaled by multiplying its percentage term by 1,000 before centering it at its sample mean. Note that
regardless of centering these variables at their means, the results are substantively identical with or
without mean-centering, and doing so simply reduces the possibility of any collinearity concern
among these particular control variables. As a robustness check to assess the significance of “Threat
of FHS” in consideration of industry concentration, we also calculate each business group’s asset-
weighted industry Herfindahl (“Asset-weighted Industry Herfindahl”) at different industry digit levels.
Specifically, we first take each industry’s Herfindahl measure using data from NICE, and then calcu-
late each business group’s asset-weighted Herfindahl by accounting for the distribution of each
group’s asset portfolio across industries in each year. Industry is defined alternatively at the two-digit,
three-digit, four-digit, and five-digit levels based on the Korea Standard Industry Classification codes.
4.4 | Method
We examine the relationship between the bribe amounts paid by business groups and the threat of
falling high status using a fixed-effects Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) panel
regression with cluster-robust standard errors that allow heteroskedasticity and within-cluster error
correlation. The unit of analysis in our regressions is “business group-year” and standard errors are
clustered at the business group level.18 Consistent with Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984),
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), and Wooldridge (2010, pp. 740–741), we use this method as it is
17Note that we centered these variables, even though none of them causes a collinearity issue for our main variable of interest, to
address any concern about a potential collinearity issue among the four control variables themselves. As part of our robustness
checks, we have also included the squared terms of these four controls. Centering those control variables, while not impacting our
variable of interest in any way, was also a way of making sure that the robustness check did not suffer from collinearity among the
control variables and their squared terms.
18We note that as discussed in Siegel and Larson (2009) and shown in Stock and Watson (2008), we have more than sufficient
degrees of freedom and are using the right estimator with clustering (Hansen, 2007).
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particularly well suited for non-count data with both a meaningful percentage of true zero values
and relatively few distinct values for the dependent variable as well as we wish to condition out any
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity that is difficult to measure. Notably, this method generates
consistent estimates under the weak assumption that only the conditional mean be correctly speci-
fied. This tells that the distribution of the outcome variable given a set of covariates does not need
to be Poisson distributed (Cameron & Trivedi, 2015, p. 234; Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006, p. 645;
Wooldridge, 2010, pp. 727–728). Poisson QMLE also does not require the well-known equality of
mean and variance property, allowing the conditional variance of the outcome variable to be almost
anything (Wooldridge, 1997, pp. 355–358), and particularly, the outcome variable does not need to
be a count variable (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 728). Since the most common mean function in applica-
tions is the exponential, which is the default for the Poisson model, we estimate the following condi-
tional mean form of the fixed-effects Poisson QMLE regression:
E yitjαi,Χit½ =αiexp Χitβð Þ ð1Þ
where yit is the dependent variable that is the bribery amount paid by business group i (1, …, 40) in
year t (1987, …, 1992), Χit are the covariates. They include our key independent variable (“Threat
of FHS Definitions 1 and 2”), its main effects (“Bonacich Measure of Status by Year” and “Medio-
cre ROA Performance by Year”), and a set of control variables that capture relational ties (“Mar-
riage Tie to a Senior Gov’t Official or Politician by Year” and “Group Has School or Marriage Tie
to Chun or Roh by Year”) and financial characteristics of the business groups (“Group ROA by
Year,” “Industry-adjusted and -weighted Group Portfolio ROA by Year,” “Log of Group Assets by
Year,” “Group Leverage by Year,” “Advertising Intensity,” “Export Intensity,” “R&D Intensity,”
and “Training Expenditure Intensity”), and year dummies that allow us to control for the average
effects of specific time periods and help alleviate bias from overall trends and events that occurred
at a specific time which might have influenced the bribery amount paid by business group. β are the
coefficients to be estimated, and αi are time-invariant, group-specific effects.
19
5 | RESULTS
As part of our initial exploratory data analysis, we contrast the yearly average of the total bribe
amounts of groups under threat of falling high status with that of groups not under such threat over
the sample time period in Figure 4. As visually illustrated, the groups under threat of falling high
status pay larger bribes on average across all years. We further examine this bivariate relationship
between threat of falling high status and bribery using a nonparametric χ2 test and report the result in
Table 2, where we modify “Threat of FHS Definition 2” as a dummy which takes the value of one if
the variable has a positive value; otherwise, zero. As shown in Table 2, the propensity to bribe for
groups under threat of falling high status is 63% vs. 36% for groups not under such threat. The differ-
ence in the propensity to bribe between the two groups is 27% (p = 0.000), which suggests a statisti-
cally meaningful effect of threat of falling high status on the business groups’ bribery decisions.
19Note that Poisson QMLE standard errors are robust to overdispersion that occurs when the conditional variance of an outcome vari-
able exceeds the conditional mean. Data with presence of overdispersion are commonly analyzed using negative binomial regression,
but the conditional negative binomial model for panel data has been known as not a true fixed-effects analysis (Allison & Waterman,
2002; Greene, 2007) and to suffer from the well-known “incidental parameters problem,” which is not an issue for a fixed-effects
Poisson model (Greene, 2007; Lancaster, 2000). We thus do not consider such alternative as an option. Likewise, a linear regression
model is inadequate to fit our data because the distribution of residuals will be heteroscedastic non-normal. Tobit regression also
requires a crucial assumption of the normality of the errors. Although our results do not change when we use a Tobit regression, the
post-regression conditional moment tests reject the null of normal errors, suggesting that Tobit is not the appropriate model.
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Next, we further explore the relationship between bribery and relative performance by status
using Figures 5 and 6. Figure 5 plots that relationship for high status groups in the 75th percentile
for our marriage-tie based status, together with the boundary of relative performance identified as
threatening high status. Figure 6 plots the same for those whose status ranges between the 50th and
the 75th percentiles. Figure 5 alone suggests that high status groups facing the current-time medio-
cre performance (inside the vertical dot lines) tend to pay larger bribes than those not (outside the
vertical dot lines). In comparison to Figure 6, Figure 5 also demonstrates that the higher the status,
the larger the bribery payment is among the groups who have at least one inter-business group mar-
riage ties (status > 0). Altogether, our exploratory data analysis points us to the next step of examin-
ing our threat of falling high status hypothesis in a multivariate context.
Table 3 reports the Poisson QMLE panel regression results with group and year fixed effects
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Threat of Falling High Status (TFHS) Group vs. Other
Comparison of Means of Total Bribery by Year
FIGURE 4 Do business groups under threat of falling high status pay larger bribes?
Notes. TFHS (Def.2) indicates high status in this year’s marriage network among Korean business groups interacted with
mediocre economic performance. Other indicates the group not categorized as TFHS
TABLE 2 χ2 test of association between threat of falling high status and bribery
Threat of Falling High Statusa
Bribe
TotalYes No
Yes 37 22 59
(row percent) (62.71) (37.29)
No 64 114 178
(row percent) (35.96) (64.04)
Total 101 136 237
Pearson χ2(1) 12.973 (Pr = 0.000)
Notes. H0: There is no association between threat of falling high status and bribery by business group.
a Dummy which takes the value of one if Threat of Falling High Status Definition 2 has a positive value; otherwise, zero.























-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Industry-adjusted and -weighted group portfolio ROA (%)
for groups with status > 2
FIGURE 5 Business groups’ relative financial performance and bribery for groups whose status based on Bonacich measure
of status is above the 75th percentile (status > 2, N = 62, 1987–1992). Vertical dot lines indicate the boundary of relative
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FIGURE 6 Business groups’ relative financial performance and bribery for groups with Bonacich measure of status is in
between the 50th and the 75th percentiles (0 < status < 2, N = 42, 1987–1992)
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TABLE 3 Poisson QMLE regressions with group fixed effects and clustered standard errors for panel data (1987–1992)
Dependent variable: Yearly
Bribe






Threat of Falling High Status
(FHS)
0.163 (0.087) 0.164 (0.081)
[0.062] [0.043]
Bonacich Measure of Status by
Year
−0.130 (0.153) (See note C) −0.247 (0.168)
[0.393] [0.142]
Mediocre ROA Performance by
Year
−0.151 (0.226) −0.351 (0.275) −0.407 (0.284)
[0.504] [0.202] [0.152]
Group Has School or Marriage
Tie to Chun or Roh by Year
−11.673 (1.110) −11.719 (1.125) −11.840 (1.153) −11.917 (1.127) −12.123 (1.163)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Marriage Tie to a Senior Gov’t
Official or Politician by Year
−1.158 (0.356) −1.231 (0.402) −1.105 (0.408) −1.109 (0.529) −1.044 (0.621)
[0.001] [0.002] [0.007] [0.036] [0.092]
Group ROA by Year 0.071 (0.104) 0.072 (0.103) 0.073 (0.104) 0.066 (0.099) 0.068 (0.098)




−0.053 (0.066) −0.045 (0.071) −0.057 (0.066) −0.006 (0.081) 0.000 (0.080)
[0.426] [0.524] [0.387] [0.943] [0.996]
Log of Group Assets by Year 0.021 (0.267) 0.068 (0.268) −0.050 (0.262) 0.092 (0.271) 0.005 (0.265)
[0.938] [0.799] [0.850] [0.736] [0.985]
Group Leverage by Year −0.655 (1.254) −0.488 (1.275) 0.148 (1.730) −0.433 (1.256) 0.495 (1.689)
[0.601] [0.702] [0.932] [0.730] [0.769]
Advertising Intensity by Year 0.207 (0.473) 0.222 (0.461) 0.157 (0.488) 0.226 (0.455) 0.220 (0.469)
[0.661] [0.631] [0.748] [0.619] [0.639]
Export Intensity by Year −0.010 (0.009) −0.009 (0.010) −0.011 (0.009) −0.009 (0.010) −0.008 (0.011)
[0.253] [0.363] [0.223] [0.412] [0.452]
R&D Intensity by Year 0.083 (1.325) 0.021 (1.332) 0.033 (1.395) 0.221 (1.342) 0.297 (1.396)
[0.950] [0.988] [0.981] [0.869] [0.832]
Training Expenditure Intensity
by Year
−0.211 (0.349) −0.192 (0.344) −0.234 (0.364) −0.226 (0.318) −0.230 (0.307)
[0.546] [0.576] [0.521] [0.477] [0.454]
Constant 2.703 (6.036) 1.735 (5.945) 4.938 (6.093) −0.487 (6.474) 3.343 (6.197)
[0.654] [0.770] [0.418] [0.940] [0.590]
Business Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.428 0.429 0.429 0.433 0.436
N 237 237 237 237 237
Notes. Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimator panel regressions where robust standard errors clustered by business groups are
reported in parentheses and p-values are reported in square brackets.
a Bonacich Measure of Status in 1987 (high status measured by the Bonacich centrality in year 1987 marriage network among Korean
business groups) × Mediocre ROA Performance (dummy that takes the value of one if the business group’s ROA performance is
between the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile of industry-adjusted ROA performance relative to peers).
b Bonacich Measure of Status by Year (high status measured by the Bonacich centrality in this year’s marriage network among
Korean business groups) × Mediocre ROA Performance (dummy that takes the value of one if the business group’s ROA perfor-
mance is between the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile of industry-adjusted ROA performance relative to peers).
c Threat of FHS Definition 1 is a cross-sectional measure for Year 1987 and therefore gets automatically absorbed as part of the group
fixed effects included in this model.
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any “Threat of FHS Definition” and its two main effects (“Bonacich Measure of Status by Year”
and “Mediocre ROA Performance by Year”). In Models (2) and (3), we add each of the two main
effects of “Threat of FHS Definition.” As shown, neither of the two main effects is statistically
meaningful. In Models (4) and (5), however, where we show the results of the two “Threat of FHS
Definitions 1 and 2,” we find that each coefficient of the two definitions is positively associated with
bribery amounts. It is noteworthy that the precision of our estimates is particularly good given the
degrees of freedom and the comprehensive control variables we use. Of the two measures, it is logi-
cal that “Threat of FHS Definition 2,” which is the one that fully reflects status change over time, is
the more statistically meaningful variable on account of its reflecting status change over time. Over-
all, this supports our hypothesis that firms with a large social endowment of high status but under
the threat of an impending fall in status due to current-time mediocre economic performance relative
to industry peers pay larger bribes, all else being equal. In particular, in Model (5) of Table 3, the
coefficient of “Threat of FHS Definition 2” means that for a one unit change in “Threat of FHS Def-
inition 2,” the difference in the logs of expected counts is expected to increase by 0.164, holding the
other covariates in the model constant at their means. Take the example starting with the dependent
variable at its mean; then holding all other variables constant, a one standard deviation increase in
“Threat of FHS Definition 2” is associated with 2.59 billion won ($3 million) in additional annual
bribes, which is economically meaningful.
Table 3 also shows that forming a marriage tie with a senior government official or politician and
forming a close social tie to Chun or Roh are associated with a decrease in bribes (p = 0.000 and
0.092, respectively in Model 5). A possible explanation is that having a close tie with Chun or Roh or
a senior government official leads to a very different relationship with the government elite. Instead
of needing to pay transactional payments to someone like Chun or Roh, the close social tie to Chun
or Roh may well facilitate a form of co-ownership in which profit sharing replaces bribery as the
method of resource sharing. The fact that under co-ownership, profit sharing may replace the transac-
tional payments known as bribery, is a prediction of Shleifer and Vishny (2002). We also report that
none of the control variables that capture the business groups’ financial characteristics is statistically
notable in Table 3. All in all, our findings suggest that the fact that the effect of status by itself or
mediocre performance by itself is not statistically meaningful implies that neither is driving the results
alone. Instead, the result suggests that it is the time-varying condition of having a legacy of high sta-
tus but dealing with current-period mediocre performance relative to peers that drives the decision of
how much in bribes to pay. This is consistent with our thesis of the threat of falling high status, where
it takes a combination of resources (status), need (the clear possibility of falling out of high status in
the future), and opportunity (the belief that bribery will lead to government-provided resources that
can be quickly invested in market capabilities and help the group to return to secure high status).
Next, inspired by the work of Ades and Di Tella (1999), which proposed that increased indus-
trial competition could bring down bribes, we take Table 3 and run Model (5) with the alternative
group-asset-weighted Herfindahls (“Asset-weighted Industry Herfindahl”) described earlier. Panel A
of Table 4 shows that not only is the “Threat of FHS Definition 2” robust to including alternative
Herfindahls based on different specificity of industry definition, but also that industrial competition
as proxied by the Herfindahl measure is not by itself a consistent or statistically meaningful predic-
tor of corporate bribery. Next, we further control for a panel measure for low status (“Low Status”
dummy), which takes the value of one if a business group has no inter-business group marriage ties
by that particular year. As prior literature (e.g., Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001) indicates, low-status
firms break social rules because they see nothing further to lose from doing so. At the same time,
low-status firms may lack the financial resources to be able to engage in bribery. Whether they are
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so severely financially constrained that they lack the money to engage in bribery is ultimately an
empirical question - since bribery is not exactly as resource-intensive as building a large-scale R&D
capability. Thus, it is worthwhile to at least explicitly rule in or rule out whether there is a low-sta-
tus-specific determinant of bribery that is distinct from high status under threat of falling. Panel B of
Table 4 shows that our main results are robust to controlling for whether low-status business groups
might have paid bribes at a different rate. Lastly, we also note that our main results are robust to
alternatively using negative binomial specifications, and do not change when we subtract the
amounts that groups gave to key quasi foundations from the dependent variable.
Finally, we implement steps to further test the interaction effect of interest in its nonlinear specifi-
cation. We adopt a simple and rigorous recentering approach proposed by Jeong, Siegel, and Chen
(2017) based on Greene (2010) and other statisticians’ advice and implement the following steps.
First, we plot the predicted bribery amounts against status with and without current-period mediocre
ROA performance, holding everything else in the model at its mean, using the most rigorous model
where we further control for both industry and low-status influences (Model 1 of Panel B, Table 4).
As seen in Figure 7, there is a notable visual difference in terms of bribes when going from high status
without current-period mediocre ROA performance to high status with current-period mediocre ROA
performance. Second, we recenter the status variable (“Bonacich Measure of Status by Year”) at the
status percentile of interest, rerun the same Poisson QMLE regression model, and then look at the
coefficient of “Mediocre ROA Performance” to ascertain (as shown in Table 4) that there is a statisti-
cally meaningful difference between high status with and without current-period mediocre ROA per-
formance. Third, we calculate the predicted bribery amounts and the economic significance of the
threat of falling high status at the status percentile of interest. As shown in Table 6, the predicted size
of bribery (technically, the incidence rate of large-scale bribery) increases by economically meaningful








Status at the 75th percentile (pct.)
100th pct.
0.147 (KRW bil.)
High status with mediocre ROA
































































Bonacich Measure of Status by Year
Mediocre ROA Performance=0 Mediocre ROA Performance=1
FIGURE 7 Threat of falling high status. Note. This figure was created based on Model 1 of Panel B in Table 4 to illustrate
above-mean status in this year’s marriage network among Korean business groups interacted with mediocre current-time
economic performance, holding everything else in the model at its mean
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6 | CONCLUSION
We find that, controlling for a range of alternative explanations, threat of falling high status—that
is, longstanding high social status threatened by current-period economic performance lagging
behind that of industry peers—is an economically and statistically meaningful predictor of large-
scale corporate bribery. Our findings suggest that following the threat of falling high status, firms,
historically on the strength of social endowment and economic performance, tend to respond to
such threat by engaging in large-scale bribery as a nonmarket strategy and pay larger bribes than
all other firms, ceteris paribus. This is particularly relevant in an institutional environment where
bribery and rule-breaking occur because the market and prevailing institutions reward both suffi-
ciently and punish them insufficiently. Our theory and findings also suggest that the concept of
status in economics and sociology can be extended and moderately reformulated to help explain
an important dimension of social deviance, large-scale corporate bribery. This study is among the
first, if not the first, to show explicitly how the social-network dynamics of status contribute to
firms’ illegal activity (in this case, payment of bribes to senior-level government officials). We
aim to contribute to the burgeoning nonmarket-strategy literature and to micro-empirical research
on causes of corruption.





bribe amount going from
high status to threat of
FHS2 at each status level
Threat of FHS2
(Bonacich Measure







of Status by Year
All other variables
at sample mean
0.035 0.141 0 0 Max value 11.393 Yes
0.175 11.393 1
0.041 0.144 0 0 99th percentile 10.824 Yes
0.185 10.824 1
0.109 0.147 0 0 95th percentile 7.174 Yes
0.256 7.174 1
0.158 0.132 0 0 90th percentile 5.791 Yes
0.290 5.791 1
Notes. This table shows that a shift to mediocre ROA performance predicts the biggest boost in predicted annual bribe amount if a
firm is a high status firm (shown here for the 90th percentile and higher). Thus this provides the evidence of threat of falling high sta-
tus leading to more bribery. Note that a shift to mediocre performance does not increase bribes for firms with low status. The simula-
tion is based on Model 1 of Panel B in Table 4.
TABLE 5 The statistically meaningful difference in going from high status to threat of falling high status
Status Level (Bonacich Measure of Status by Year) Z-statistic p > |Z|
Recentered at the max. value of 11.393 2.27 0.023
Recentered at the 99th percentile of 10.824 2.27 0.024
Recentered at the 95th percentile of 7.174 2.16 0.031
Recentered at the 90th percentile of 5.791 2.01 0.044
Notes. This table was created based on Model 1 of Panel B in Table 4 to show that there is a statistically meaningful difference in
going from high status to threat of falling high status at the 90th percentile and higher. The method employed is to recenter the status
variable at the percentile of interest, and then to run this model with the recentered status variable each time, and then to utilize the p-
value associated with the Mediocre ROA Performance variable as the indicator of the effect of going from high status to falling high
status at each level of high status. We use this model because this is an emerging economy in which groups are not highly specialized
at the granular industry level and are likely to be foremost focused on the concentration level within their two-digit industry sector.
Nevertheless, we see substantially similar results using the alternative models in Table 4.
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In the absence of an instrumental variable or exogenous shock, there is always at least the possi-
bility of simultaneity and feedback. That said, our evidence supports our prediction that highly
endowed social status interacted with mediocre economic performance is positively correlated with
an increase in the amount of bribery. The precision of our estimates of “Threat of Falling High Sta-
tus Definitions 1 and 2” is notable particularly given the degrees of freedom we have and compre-
hensive control variables we use. Further precision of those estimates is not possible given our
sample size despite the fact that those 40 business groups represent a very high percentage of the
total value-added in South Korea.
Our findings about threat of falling high status can also be useful to those interested in how
institutions might be used to reduce bribery and its negative social-welfare effects. To the extent that
law enforcement and the media face resource constraints in monitoring companies, it pays to know
which types of companies should be most closely monitored, and under which types of conditions.
It may make sense to concentrate on measuring relative company status in a dynamic sense, and on
examining whether the threat of falling high status leads companies to increase their reliance on
large-scale bribery.
South Korea is not an idiosyncratic test case. It is representative of a large number of third-wave
democracies, also known as emerging or transition economies. The political scientist Samuel
P. Huntington distinguished three modern waves of democratization; during the third wave, extend-
ing from the mid-1970s into the 1990s (Huntington, 1991), over 65 new democracies emerged
across the world (Møller & Skaaning, 2013, p. 99), South Korea’s among them. Because South Kor-
ea’s democratization preceded that of numerous other countries, it provides some leading indicators
of how democratization changes business and society. Political scientists actively study the
1987–1992 time period, at the heart of third-wave democratization, in an effort to predict subsequent
sociopolitical developments (Møller & Skaaning, 2013); the political science literature has identified
a number of common patterns. Our theory and evidence offer insights and policy implications on
large-scale corporate bribery pertinent to the approximately 65 emerging economies whose institu-
tional contexts resemble South Korea’s during its pre-democratization and early democratization
periods, and to some extent also to developed economies that have witnessed a surge in large-scale
corporate bribery scandals in recent years.
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